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Using a panel of 65,551 firms over the period 2000-2006, this study examines the capital structure 
determinants of Chinese privately owned small and medium-sized enterprises. Investment in the 
building and maintenance of social capital, measured by entertainment expenditure, is found to be 
positively associated with short-term leverage, but negatively associated with long-term leverage, 
while the opposite is the case for asset structure. This suggests that social capital is important for 
firms who seek to establish initial relationships with their financiers, while asset structure is more 
important in the consolidation of these relationships. 
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There is growing recognition that theories of capital structure from the finance paradigm do not fully explain the 
capital structure of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This is especially the case in the context of 
developing economies where institutional and cultural factors exert a significant influence on the financing 
decisions of firms. Although a growing number of studies have examined the capital structure determinants of 
large, listed firms in China, limited work has been conducted on SMEs. This study investigates the extent to 
which existing theories of capital structure can assist in our understanding of the capital structure adopted by 
Chinese SMEs.   
 
One factor that has been shown to influence the decision-making of Chinese firms is the social and 
business relationships they possess with other economic actors, which include executives at other firms, bank 
officials, and government officials. The social capital inherent in such relationships enables firms to gain 
preferential access to a whole host of scarce information or resources, one of which may be financial capital. 
Due to the fact that the state-owned banks in China continue to discriminate against the private sector in their 
lending practices, investment in the building and maintenance of social capital may enable SMEs to get 
preferential access to credit over their competitors and, hence, employ more debt, in their capital structure. 
Despite a growing focus on the impact of social capital on SME performance in China, limited work has been 
conducted on whether it helps improve the ability of firms to access external financing. To fill this gap in the 
literature this study investigates the extent to which investment in the building and maintenance of social capital 
influences the capital structure of Chinese SMEs.  
 
Using a sample of 65,551 enterprises from across China, we show that existing theories do not fully 
explain the capital structure adopted by Chinese SMEs. To understand the financing decisions of SMEs, it is in 
fact important to examine the cultural and institutional environment in which they operate, which is typically 
ignored by those theories. Our results suggest that social capital is an important determinant of capital structure 
for Chinese privately-owned SMEs. In particular, a positive relationship is found between investment in social 
capital and both total and short term leverage. In contrast investment in social capital is found to be negatively 
associated to long-term leverage. The opposite is true for asset structure. This indicates that social capital is 
important for firms who seek to establish initial relationships with their financiers, while asset structure is more 
important in the consolidation of these relationships.  
 
Our findings have important policy implications: policy makers need to recognize the importance of 
improving the ability of privately owned SMEs to access bank financing, especially in the long-term. Informal 
financing mechanisms based on social capital might have supported the growth of Chinese SMEs until the 
present day, but are arguably not appropriate if China is to develop world-class private enterprises able to 




1.  Introduction 
The capital structure decisions of firms, and in particular of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) have important implications for their performance, their ability to 
succeed, their risk of failure and their potential for future development (Cassar, 2004)
1. 
For instance, the inability to secure adequate sources of finance has been cited as a 
primary cause of SME failure (Gaskill and Van Auken, 1993; Van Auken and Neeley, 
1996; Coleman, 2000). Understanding how SMEs are financed is therefore an important 
question. A vast body of literature has examined the determinants of the capital structure 
of SMEs in the context of developed economies over the last decade. Empirical work 
based on theories of capital structure has been conducted for Australia (Romano, 
Tanewski & Kosmas, 2000; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Johnsen and McMahon, 2005), 
Spain (Sorgorb-Mira, 2005), the UK (Hall, Hutchinson & Michaelas, 2000; Jordan, Lowe 
& Taylor, 1998; Michaelas, Chittenden & Poutziouris, 1999), and the US (Gregory et al., 
2005). 
Only in recent years, has empirical work on capital structure been extended to the 
developing economy context. The level of development of a country’s legal and financial 
systems has been shown to influence the capital structure that firms adopt (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Fan et al., 2006). Specifically, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) find that in economies with weak investor 
protection, firms are more likely to employ short-term debt than long-term debt in their 
capital structure. In contrast, they demonstrate that firms in economies with active stock 
markets and large banking sectors have more long-term debt than those in economies 
with small capital markets and banking sectors. Booth et al. (2001) examine the capital 
structure of firms in 10 developing economies and find evidence that, although the 
determinants of capital structure are similar to those in developed countries, the amount 
of long and short-term debt employed by enterprises differs greatly from economy to 
economy. Fan et al. (2006) show that firms operating in legal systems with better 
protection for investors tend to have less total debt and a greater proportion of long-term 
debt in their capital structures.  
                                                 
1 Capital structure is defined as the mixture of debt and equity used to finance the business activities of a 
firm (Myers, 1994). 2 
 
Despite a growing body of research on the determinants of capital structure in the 
developing economy context, there has been limited work conducted on SMEs. Some 
preliminary work has been carried out for Poland (Klapper et al., 2006), Vietnam 
(Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006), and Ghana (Abor and Biekpe, 2007). This work 
suggests that theories of capital structure developed to explain the financing decisions of 
SMEs in developed economies are not always applicable in developing economies, due to 
institutional and cultural differences.  
The contribution made by SMEs to the phenomenal economic growth experienced 
in China over the last twenty years has been well documented in the literature (Chen, 
2006; Dougherty and Herd, 2005). A recent study suggests that the dynamic SME sector 
accounts for over 55 per cent of Chinese GDP and 75 per cent of employment (Farrell et 
al., 2006). Despite the contributions they make to the economy, Chinese SMEs, 
especially those that are privately owned, continue to face difficulties in accessing 
adequate financial capital to support their development (Bai et al., 2006), in comparison 
to other Asian countries (Dollar et al., 2003). 
Empirical work on capital structure in the Chinese context is limited. Focusing on 
a panel of 77 Chinese PLCs over the period 1994-2000, Chen (2004) finds that the 
traditional capital structure theories developed in western economies do not hold in the 
Chinese context. Huang and Song (2006) use a panel of 1200 PLCs over the period 1994-
2003 and show that leverage increases with firm size, fixed assets, volatility, and non-
debt tax shields, and decrease with profitability. Bhabra et al. (2008) find that over the 
period 1992-2001, Chinese listed firms use little long-term debt, which is positively 
related to firm size and asset tangibility, and negatively associated with profitability and 
growth. Using a more recent dataset made up of 650 PLCs over the period 1999-2004, 
and a dynamic specification, Qian et al. (2009) show that leverage is positively associated 
with firm size and tangibility, but negatively related to profitability, non-debt tax shields, 
volatility, and growth. Finally, Li et al. (2009) use a panel made up of 417,068 firm-year 
observations over the period 2000-2004 to show that ownership and governance 
structures play an important role in firms’ financing decisions. With the exception of Li 
et al. (2009), all this work has been limited to large listed firms. Despite SMEs being the 
main engine behind economic growth in China, the lack of comprehensive firm-level data 3 
 
on these firms has made it difficult for researchers to understand the determinants of their 
financing behavior. In order to fill this significant gap in the literature, we use a relatively 
large, new, and underused dataset conducted by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 
to examine the capital structure determinants in the Chinese SME context
2. The final data 
used in our analysis is made up of 65,551 private SMEs from all provinces in China 
during the period 2000 to 2006. Containing 110,770 observations, it is the largest and 
most representative dataset in existence.  
We contribute to the literature in three main ways. First, we examine the capital 
structure determinants of privately owned Chinese SMEs using a large dataset 
representative of firm activity across the whole country. We choose to focus on private 
SMEs due to the fact that they are subject to financial constraints not faced by publicly-
owned firms, who continue to receive substantial state support. To the best of our 
knowledge, no empirical study has been conducted to test the applicability of existing 
capital structure theories to such firms in the Chinese context. Second, we consider social 
capital as a determinant of capital structure. Although previous work has found a 
relationship between social capital and firm performance (Peng and Luo, 2000; Zhang 
and Fung, 2006; Fung et al., 2007), no work has been conducted on the relationship 
between social capital and capital structure in the Chinese context. This is an important 
gap in the literature in the light of the fact that expenditure in building and maintaining 
social capital represents on average 6.7% of the total assets of the firms in our sample. 
Third, in line with recent work on larger firms (Qian et al., 2009), we are the first study to 
adopt a dynamic approach to estimating the capital structure determinants of SMEs, 
taking into account the evolving nature of a firm’s financing decisions over time.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we describe the 
theoretical background on capital structure. In section 3, we present our baseline 
specification, and discuss our estimation methodology. Section 4 describes our data and 
presents some descriptive statistics. In section 5, we illustrate and discuss our results. 
Finally, in section 6, we provide some conclusions. 
 
                                                 
2 Li et al. (2009) make use of the same dataset as ours to study Chinese firms’ capital structure, but they do 
not focus on SMEs. The main objective of their study is to understand the role of ownership and 
institutional development in determining firms’ capital structure. 4 
 
2.  Theoretical background 
Since the publication of Modigliani and Miller’s seminal work in 1958, a number of 
theoretical explanations have been advanced to explain the financing decisions of firms. 
The two theories which have gained the most attention in the literature are the static 
trade-off and pecking-order theories.  
 
3.1  The static trade-off theory: The static trade-off theory takes into account the effect 
of taxes, agency costs and the costs of financial distress on the capital structure decisions 
of the firm. The management of the firm is assumed to maintain an optimal debt/equity 
ratio in order to minimize the cost of prevailing market imperfections, trading off the tax 
shield benefits of debt finance and the agency and financial distress costs of maintaining 
high debt levels (Scott, 1972; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Kim, 1978; Bradley et al, 
1984; Harris and Raviv, 1990).  
The static-trade off theory is illustrated in figure 1. In the diagram the straight line 
AB shows the value of a firm that uses 100% equity to finance its business. If a firm uses 
debt in its capital structure, it has to pay interest, which is generally tax deductible. 
Interest payments act as a tax shield and allow the firm to increase its value. As the firm 
takes more debt, its value increases (curve AC). However, after a certain level of debt 
(the optimum level) is reached, the value of the firm starts to decrease, as the costs of 
debt start to outweigh the benefits. Curve AD illustrates how the costs of financial 
distress rise as the firm uses increasing amounts of debt in its capital structure. At higher 
levels of debt, the firm’s interest payments increase to cover for the potential risk of 
financial distress. In summary, the firm trades off the tax benefits that may be gained by 
using debt with the costs of financial distress and agency costs, to maintain an optimal 
level of debt in its capital structure. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Under the static trade-off theory we would expect leverage to be positively related 
to firm size (the larger the firm, the lower the costs of bankruptcy), profitability (the more 
profitable the firm, the greater the profits that need to be shielded from taxation and the 5 
 
lower the costs of financial distress), and asset structure (the larger the assets of the firm 
the lower the costs of bankruptcy)
3.  
Previous empirical work questions the applicability of the static trade-off theory 
to the SME context, suggesting that the explanatory power of the theory is low and 
empirical results inconclusive (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Watson and Wilson, 2002). This 
might be due to the fact that, due to difficulties in accessing adequate external sources of 
debt and equity financing, managers of SMEs find it difficult to trade-off the benefits of 
debt and equity as predicted by the static trade-off theory.  
 
2.2  The pecking-order theory: An alternative explanation in the literature as to how 
firms make their capital structure decisions is the pecking-order theory or POT (Myers, 
1984). The POT suggests that firms order their financing choices in a hierarchical 
pecking-order, using internal sources of finance initially, before seeking debt financing 
second, and introducing new equity as a last resort. Under the POT, capital structure 
decisions are made to mitigate the inefficiencies arising as a result of asymmetric 
information. Initially it is assumed that firms will prefer to use internal sources of 
financing as they are less susceptible to asymmetric information problems, and therefore 
cheaper than debt or equity. When firms need external financing, they will first issue debt, 
which is less susceptible to undervaluation than new equity, which will be issued as a last 
resort.  
The pecking-order theory is illustrated in figure 2. In the diagram demand for 
finance is represented by the D1, D2 and D3 schedules. When demand for finance is low 
at D1, investment is financed through internal funds, which are cheaper than external 
sources of finance. When demand for finance is relatively high at D2, external debt 
financing is used once internal sources of finance have been exhausted. Finally, if 
                                                 
3  Recent studies (see for instance Flannery and Rangan, 2006) indicate that the trade-off between the 
benefits and costs of debt financing might not be static in nature, but might depend on the costs of making 
adjustments towards an optimal level of debt. The dynamic version of the trade-off theory supposes that, 
due to significant adjustment costs, firms will not constantly adjust their leverage ratio to their optimal level. 
Firms will only choose to rebalance their capital structure when the costs of deviating from the optimal 
level outweigh the costs of adjustment. 
 6 
 
demand for finance is very high at D3, firms will finance via issuing equity once internal 
funds and debt financing have been exhausted. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Under the pecking order theory we would expect leverage to be positively related 
to the firm’s size (the larger the firm, the more established it is likely to be, and the lower 
the degree of asymmetric information it is likely to face), negatively related to the 
profitability of the firm (the more profitable the firm, the greater the internal financing 
available), and positively related to the its asset structure (the greater the percentage of 
fixed assets possessed by the firm, the easier it is to access collateralized debt).  
In recent years a growing number of studies have examined the applicability of 
the pecking-order theory of financing to SMEs (Ang, 1991; Holmes and Kent, 1991; 
Jordan et al., 1998; Berggren et al, 2000; Watson and Wilson, 2002; Hogan and Hutson, 
2005; Sorgorb-Mira, 2005). There is a general consensus in the empirical literature that 
the pecking-order theory provides a much sounder theoretical explanation than the static 
trade-off theory for the capital structure that SMEs adopt (Watson and Wilson, 2002; 
Sorgorb-Mira, 2005). Some authors suggest a more constrained version of the pecking-
order theory in the SME context than is the case for larger firms (Ang, 1991; Holmes and 
Kent, 1991). They point out that smaller firms rely overwhelmingly on internal sources of 
finance in the start-up and development phases. 
 
2.3  The role of social capital: It has been suggested that the theories developed to 
explain the financing decisions of SMEs in the Western context might not be applicable 
in the developing economies context due to cultural and institutional differences 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Fan et al., 2006). We 
contend that in the context of developing countries, where SMEs face huge difficulties in 
accessing formal sources of finance (Batra et al., 2003; Bai et al., 2006), both the static 
trade-off and pecking order theories of capital structure alone might not fully explain the 
financing behavior of SMEs. We argue that the social capital inherent in a firm’s web of 
interpersonal relationships with other economic actors will also be an important 7 
 
determinant of their ability to access adequate sources of capital from external sources. 
  Over the last decade there has been a growing literature on social capital and its 
relationship with firm performance in the Chinese context (Peng and Luo, 2000; Park and 
Luo, 2001; Zhang and Fung, 2006; Fung et al., 2007). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, 
no study has focused on the relationship between social capital and the financing 
behavior of Chinese firms.  
In this study we follow the previous literature by conceptualizing social capital as 
the resources inherent in the informal web of personal relationships that senior executives 
at the firm have with other economic actors, which may include executives at other firms, 
bank officials, and government officials (Peng and Luo, 2000; Park and Luo, 2001). Such 
relationships are known as “guanxi” in Chinese and are reinforced by implicit rules of 
reciprocity and interpersonal obligation (Park and Luo, 2001). The social capital inherent 
in such relationships confers numerous benefits on firms regardless of their capabilities, 
which may include access to scarce information or resources (see Adler and Kwon (2002) 
for a detailed review). One scarce resource, especially in the developing economies 
context, is financial capital. Good social relationships with executives at other firms 
should improve firm access to trade credit and inter-firm loans, and good relationships 
with bank officials should improve firm access to bank financing. Due to the fact that the 
Chinese government still maintains significant direction over credit allocation, firms that 
have good relationships with government officials should also find it easier to obtain 
financial capital from the banking sector (Farrell et al., 2006; Brandt and Zhu, 2007). 
Preliminary work on the relationship between social capital and capital structure 
has been conducted in the United States (Uzzi, 1999) and Vietnam (Nguyen and 
Ramachandran, 2006). Uzzi (1999) demonstrates that, when their transactions are 
embedded in social relationships and networks, firms are able to gain better access to 
bank financing at a more competitive price. Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) find that 
building close social relationships with financial institutions enables SMEs to get 
preferential access to credit over their competitors and, hence, employ more debt, 
especially short term debt, in their capital structure. They also demonstrate the stronger 
the level of networking with other firms, the greater the debt employed by SMEs in their 
capital structure.  8 
 
In this study, we extend this growing stream of literature by investigating the 
relationship between social capital and capital structure in the Chinese context.  We 
follow previous work by utilizing entertainment expenditure as a proxy for social capital 
(Zhang and Fung, 2006; Fung et al., 2007). This proxy is chosen due to the lack of 
alternative measures of social capital in our dataset, and the fact that in China the wining 
and dining of officials and executives is an important part of business culture. Indeed, 
expenditure on entertainment has been shown to be a significant determinant of the 
performance of privately owned enterprises in China (Zhang and Fung, 2006) and 
accounts for an average of around 6.7% of the total assets of the firms in our sample, a 
significant amount by conventional standards. Entertainment expenditure includes the 
costs of meals, gifts and other related expenses, and therefore represents the investment 
made by an enterprise in building business and social relationships at an individual and 
organizational level.   
 
3  Baseline specification and estimation methodology 
 
3.1  Baseline specification. In order to test our hypotheses, and motivated by the 
literature on capital structure, we estimate the following baseline dynamic model: 
 
Levit / stlevit /ltlevit = a0 + a1(levit-1 / stlevit-1 /ltlevit-1) + a2sizeit-1 + a3ageit +  a4(net fixed 
assets/total assets)it-1 + a5(fixed asset growth)it-1 + a6ROAit-1 + a7(depreciation/total 
assets)it-1  + a8(social capital/total assets)it-1 + vi + vt + vj + vp + eit,     (1) 
 
where i indexes firms; t, time; j, industries; and p, provinces. Lev, stlev, and ltlev indicate 
in turn the total leverage to total assets ratio, the short-term leverage to total assets ratio, 
and the long-term leverage to total assets ratio
4. We chose a dynamic specification to take 
into account the fact that the firm may have a target leverage ratio, which it may take 
time to reach due to adjustment costs (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). (1-a1) can be seen as 
the firm’s speed of adjustment towards its optimal leverage ratio.  In  line  with  the 
                                                 
4  Short-term leverage includes bank loans, accounts payable, and other current liabilities. Long-term 
leverage includes long-term debt and other non-current liabilities.  See Table 1 for precise definitions of all 
variables included in Equation (1). 9 
 
predictions of both the pecking-order and the static trade-off theories, we expect firm size 
(which in our equation is measured as the logarithm of the firm’s real sales) to be 
positively related to leverage. The pecking order theory surmises that smaller firms may 
use less debt in their capital structure due to high levels of asymmetric information which 
makes it relatively difficult to access bank financing compared to larger firms. According 
to the static trade-off theory, larger firms should have more debt in their capital structure 
due to lower costs of bankruptcy compared to smaller firms who are seen as being more 
risky in the eyes of lenders. Previous empirical research on SMEs in the context of 
developed economies (Cassar, 2004; Sorgorb-Mira, 2005), on larger Chinese enterprises 
(Huang and Song, 2006), and on SMEs in developing economies (Klapper et al., 2006; 
Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006) confirms a positive relationship between firm size and 
all forms of leverage.  
Both the pecking-order and static-trade off theories are silent as regards the 
relationship between age and leverage. Berger and Udell (1995) hypothesize that older 
firms will find it easier to access debt financing as asymmetric information problems with 
lenders are resolved through improvements in the firm’s public reputation. Previous 
empirical work on SMEs investigating this relationship produced mixed results. Hall et al. 
(2000) find evidence of a negative relationship between the age of a firm and both short 
and long-term leverage in UK SMEs, whereas Romano et al. (2000) do not find age to be 
a significant predictor of leverage for Australian SMEs. In the context of developing 
economies, Abor and Biekpe (2007) find evidence of a strong positive relationship 
between firm age and access to bank financing in Ghanaian enterprises, whereas Klapper 
et al. (2006) find a negative relationship between firm age and both short-term and long-
term leverage for Polish enterprises. In line with the previous findings from research on 
larger Chinese firms (Li et al., 2009), we expect a positive relationship between firm age 
and all forms of leverage for Chinese SMEs. 
In line with the pecking-order theory, we expect a positive relationship between 
the asset structure of the firm (defined as the ratio between net fixed assets and total 
assets) and its ability to access bank financing. Previous research highlights the use of 
fixed assets as a mechanism for resolving information asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers and reducing financial risk for lenders (Berger and Udell, 1998). Empirical 10 
 
research on SME financing indicates a positive relationship between asset structure and 
long-term leverage, but a negative relationship between asset structure and short-term 
leverage (Chittenden et al., 1996; Hall et al., 2000; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Sorgorb-
Mira, 2005; Ortqvist et al., 2006; Li et al., 2009). Sorgorb-Mira (2005) suggests such 
findings result from long-term leverage being secured against fixed assets. Empirical 
work in developing economies produces similar results (Klapper et al., 2006). Huang and 
Song (2006) find a positive relationship between asset structure and both long-term and 
total leverage for larger Chinese firms. For Chinese SMEs, we expect a positive 
relationship between asset structure and long-term leverage and a negative relationship 
with short-term leverage: long term financing is in fact only possible on the production of 
collateral, whereas a greater percentage of short term borrowing might be unsecured. 
Previous research indicates reliance by Chinese SMEs on substantial amounts of trade 
credit and informal financing, which is generally unsecured (Allen et al., 2005; Cull et al., 
2009; Ge and Qiu, 2007; Ayygari et al., 2008; Du and Girma, 2009). 
According to the pecking order theory, a firm will tend to finance investment 
through retained earnings first, and raise external financing only when it is essential 
(Myers, 1984). This suggests a negative relationship between a firm’s profitability 
(measured in terms of the return to assets) and its leverage. This is opposite to what is 
hypothesized by the static trade-off theory which suggests the more profitable the firm 
the greater the use of bank financing due to an increased need to shield profits from 
taxation and lower costs of financial distress. Despite some conflicting findings (Hall et 
al., 2000), empirical studies on SMEs in developed countries overwhelmingly confirm a 
negative relationship between profitability and all forms of leverage (Chittenden et al., 
1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Michaelas et al., 1999; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Sorgorb-Mira, 
2005). In the developing economies context, Klapper et al. (2006) confirm a negative 
relationship between firm profitability and both short-term and long-term leverage. In 
contrast, Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) do not find strong evidence of a significant 
link between profitability and leverage in Vietnamese SMEs. Previous empirical work on 
larger Chinese firms indicates a negative relationship between profitability and capital 
structure (Chen and Strange, 2005, Huang and Song, 2006). We expect to find a negative 11 
 
relationship between profitability and all forms of leverage in the context of Chinese 
SMEs.  
According to the static trade-off theory, there are several mechanisms that may 
act as a substitute to the role of debt in reducing the tax liability of a firm (Sorgorb-Mira, 
2005). These are labeled non-debt tax shields and may include research and development 
expenses and depreciation. Empirical work on SMEs confirms a negative relationship 
between such tax shields and leverage for both SMEs in developed economies (Sorgorb-
Mira, 2005) and larger Chinese firms (Huang and Song, 2006). We expect to observe a 
similar relationship for Chinese SMEs. 
Finally, we expect positive relationships between the firm’s growth opportunities 
(measured as its fixed asset growth) and investment in social capital (measured by 
entertainment expenditure) and all types of leverage. 
The error term in Equation (1) is made up of a firm-specific time-invariant 
component (vi), encompassing all time-invariant firm characteristics likely to influence 
investment, as well as the time-invariant component of the measurement error affecting 
any of the regression variables; a time-specific component (vt) accounting for possible 
business cycle effects; an industry-specific component (vj); a province-specific 
component (vp); and an idiosyncratic component.  We take into account the vt , vp , and vj 




3.2 Estimation  methodology: Focusing on total and short-term leverage, we initially 
estimate equation (1) using OLS. Yet, OLS does not take into account unobserved 
heterogeneity and the possible endogeneity of the regressors
6. For this reason, we also 
present estimates obtained using a GMM system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). This estimator combines in a system the relevant equation in 
                                                 
5 It is important to include industry dummies in all specifications, considering that levels of leverage vary 
across industries. For instance, capital intensive manufacturing firms and utility companies typically have 
high leverage, while hi-tech and mining companies are generally characterized by low leverage (Qian et al., 
2009). 
6 Specifically, with reference to Equation (1), OLS does not take into account the vi component of the error 
term. 12 
 
first differences and in levels
7. It makes use of values of the regressors lagged two and/or 
three times as instruments in the differenced equation, and of differences of the regressors 
lagged once or twice in the levels equation
8. In our specifications, we also include the 
following additional external instruments: an indicator of regional financial development 
defined as the ratio of private lending to GDP, and dummies indicating whether the firm 
is affiliated to central, provincial, or other governments.
9 The system GMM estimator is 
preferred to the simple first-difference GMM estimator when instruments are likely to be 
weak (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
To evaluate whether our instruments are legitimate and our model is correctly 
specified, we use the tests for the second and third-order serial correlation of the residuals 
in the differenced equation (AR(2)  and AR(3)). The AR(2) and  AR(3) tests are 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no second/third-order 
serial correlation of the differenced residuals, and provide a check on the legitimacy of 
variables dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments in the differenced equation
10. In addition, we 
use the Hansen/Sargan test (also known as J test), which is a test for overidentifying 
restrictions. Under the null of instrument validity, this test is asymptotically distributed as 
a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number 
of parameters
11.  
When focusing on long-term leverage, we also estimate Equation (1) using OLS and a 
GMM specification. Yet, because long-term debt is equal to 0 in a large number of cases, 
we also report a simple and an Instrumental Variable (IV) Tobit specifications
12. In the 
latter case, our instrument set consists of the second lags of all explanatory variables 
                                                 
7 Estimating the Equation in first-differences is a way to control for the vi component of the error term.  
8 We started using two lags of the regressors as instruments in the differenced equation. If the AR(2) test 
and/or the Hansen/Sargan  test failed, we used instruments lagged three times, in which case the AR(3) test 
became the relevant test for the serial correlation of the differenced residuals (Brown and Petersen, 2009). 
These tests are described in detail below.  
9 More than half of Chinese firms (including private firms) are affiliated to the government at various 
levels. This affiliation may affect firms’ access to various resources (Li et al., 2008). Importantly, political 
affiliation is normally assigned to established firms from the very beginning of the registration process. The 
political affiliation dummies can hence be considered as exogenous variables.   
10 If the un-differenced error terms are i.i.d., then the differenced residuals should display first-order serial 
correlation. The AR(1) test, which is reported in Tables 2 and 3, shows that this is the case  in all our 
specifications. 
11 Note that the AR(2) and AR(3) tests and the Hansen/Sargan test do not allow us to discriminate between 
bad instruments and model specification 
12 Long-term liabilities could in principle take negative values, but these negative values are not observed 
due to censoring. 13 
 
except age, the regional financial development indicator, and the political affiliation 
dummies.  
 
4  Data and summary statistics 
We use data drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms with the 
National Bureau of Statistics over the period 2000-2006. All state-owned enterprises and 
other types of enterprises with annual sales of more than five million RMB (about 
$650,000) are covered. These firms operate in the manufacturing and mining sectors and 
come from 31 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities. Because our focus is 
limited to small and medium-sized private firms, we limit our attention to those privately 
owned firms with sales less than 30 million RMB and fewer than 300 employees that are 
registered as private
13. Observations with negative sales, as well as observations with 
negative total assets minus total fixed assets, and total assets minus liquid assets were 
dropped. Firms that did not have complete records on our main regression variables were 
also dropped. To control for the potential influence of outliers, we excluded observations 
in the one percent tails of each of the regression variables. The inclusion of lagged 
explanatory variables coupled with the first-differencing of our estimating equations 
meant we also had to drop two years of observations for all firms. This left us with a final 
panel covering 65,551 unlisted firms and corresponding to 110,770 firm-year 
observations. Our panel is unbalanced, with number of observations ranging from a 
minimum of 4,380 in 2000 to a maximum of 43,138 in 2006
14. 
  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics relative to the main variables used in our 
regression analysis. We can see that the leverage to total assets ratio is generally quite 
high (58.7 per cent). Most of this debt is short-term, as only 24.4 per cent of our firm-
years hold long-term debt, and the ratio of long-term liabilities to total assets is only 3.8 
per cent. This finding is in line with Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), who show 
that firms in developing countries tend to depend more on short-term debt. The firms in 
our sample perform well in terms of growth: their mean fixed asset growth rate is in fact 
7.6 per cent. Their average return on assets is also high (7.4 per cent), which suggests 
                                                 
13 This way of defining SMEs is suggested by the NBS. 
14 The exact structure of the panel is described in the Appendix. 14 
 
good overall performance. Coming to social capital, this is defined as total management 
fee net of other major sub-accounts of management fee, which leaves social and 
entertainment expenses
15. The average ratio of these fees to total assets is equal to 6.7 per 
cent, which indicates that investment in building and maintaining social capital is 
important for private SMEs. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  Results and discussion 
 
5.1  Total leverage and short-term leverage: Table 2 presents the estimates of 
Equation (1). Columns 1 and 2 refer to the estimates for total leverage, obtained using the 
OLS and system GMM estimators respectively. We can see that in both specifications, 
social capital attracts a positive and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that the 
more entertainment expenses firms incur, the more leverage they can obtain. Hence, in 
addition to enhancing firm performance (Zhang and Fung, 2006), social capital also 
positively affects the ability of firms to obtain leverage. This may result from the fact that, 
typically, private firms were, and continue to be, discriminated against by the banking 
sector. Until 1998, when the Chinese constitution was changed to acknowledge the 
private sector to be an integral part of the economy, the state-owned commercial banks 
were instructed to lend to state-owned enterprises only. The liberalization of the financial 
system that followed, theoretically, should have led to the end of discriminatory lending 
in favor of state-owned enterprises. However, in practice, banks still consider private 
enterprises to be riskier than their publicly-owned counterparts, due to their shorter credit 
history and lower chances of being bailed out by the government when in financial 
difficulties. The problem is likely to be greater for SMEs than larger private firms. The 
former may therefore choose to entertain bank directors, making their goals and 
                                                 
15 The other major sub-accounts of the management fee include fees paid for training, insurance, and travel 
purposes, as well as fees paid to trade unions and environmental agencies. Note that social and 
entertainment fees do not directly measure social capital, but the resources used to build social capital. See 
Zhang and Fung, (2006) and Fung et al. (2007) who used a similar measure of social capital. 15 
 
investment projects known to them, and hence reducing the degree of asymmetric 
information that they face.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
As for the other regressors, the lagged dependent variable has a positive and 
significant coefficient, which is equal to 0.71 in column 1 and 0.76 in column 2, and 
indicates that around 30 per cent of the deviation between the actual total leverage to 
assets ratio from its optimal level is eliminated within a year (Qian et al., 2009). This 
rather fast adjustment speed is similar to that found by Flannery and Rangan (2006) for 
US firms.  
Contrary to the predictions of both the pecking order and trade-off theories, the 
firm’s asset structure attracts a negative and statistically significant coefficient in the OLS 
specification. The significant proportion of short-term over long-term debt in the capital 
structure of Chinese SMEs most likely explains this negative relationship, as short-term 
debt is generally unsecured or secured against the current assets of the firm. This is 
consistent with the findings of previous research and provides evidence that firms match 
the duration of their assets and liabilities (Cassar and Holmes, 2003). In addition the 
greater use of informal sources of financing in China compared to the West, which are 
secured against the ‘social capital’ inherent in social and business networks, as opposed 
to fixed assets, might also explain these findings.  
Column 1 indicates a positive association between the firm’s size and its total 
leverage, which however, disappears in column 2. Age generally has an insignificant 
coefficient. Tangible fixed asset growth is positively related to leverage in column 1, 
suggesting that the higher the firm’s investment opportunities, the more leverage it will 
take. Finally, in line with the pecking-order theory, the return on assets (ROA) exhibits a 
negative coefficient in column 1.  
Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates for short-term leverage, obtained 
respectively using OLS and the system GMM estimator. Once again, in both 
specifications, social capital attracts a positive and precisely determined coefficient. The 16 
 
remaining coefficients are similar to those reported in columns 1 and 2. In particular, 
asset structure and asset growth have respectively a negative and positive coefficient in 
both specifications. Furthermore, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 
precisely determined and equal to 0.7 in both columns. Finally, in all columns of Table 2, 
depreciation, which can be seen as a non-debt tax shield, attracts a poorly determined 
coefficient. This can be seen as evidence against the trade-off theory. The Hansen/Sargan 
and AR(2)/AR(3) tests suggest that instruments lagged two/three times are suitable and 
that our model does not suffer from gross mis-specification problems. 
In summary, the results in Table 2 suggest that neither the pecking-order theory 
nor the trade-off theory are fully supported when tested on our panel of Chinese SMEs. 
Furthermore, investment in social capital, which has been ignored in capital structure 
theories, is positively associated with both short-term and total leverage. These results are 
robust to estimating our equations with both OLS and GMM. 
 
5.2  Long-term leverage: Table 3 reports our estimates for the long-term debt to asset 
ratio. Colum 1 contains the OLS estimates; column 2, the GMM estimates; column 3, the 
Tobit estimates; and column 4, the IV Tobit estimates. The results are remarkably 
consistent across specifications. Two findings are worth noting. First, our social capital 
dummy attracts a negative coefficient in all columns. Second, contrary to the case of 
short-term debt, the asset structure variable now has a positive coefficient. The latter 
finding is in line with Chittenden et al. (1996), Hall et al. (2000), Cassar and Holmes 
(2003), Sorgorb-Mira (2005), Ortqvist et al. (2006), and Li et al. (2009). 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 These results suggest that in the Chinese context, social capital acts as a 
substitute for fixed assets as security for short-term lending, whereas fixed assets are used 
as security for long-term lending. Short-term financing generally consists of informal 
financing and trade credit, as well as short-term loans from banks. When borrowing 
informally or using trade credit, social capital is extremely important and assets are less 
important. Financial institutions are only willing to lend in the short-term to SMEs, 17 
 
especially those with a short history and high levels of asymmetric information. For these 
SMEs, it is particularly important to spend time and resources to build up successful 
working relationships with their bank and other firms to gain access to sufficient sources 
of financing. On the other hand, firms that are able to access long-term financing 
generally have less of a need to invest in the building and maintenance of social capital 
due to less asymmetric information between them and their bank. These are generally 
successful firms, which have already built up a good relationship with their bank and 
other firms, and have sufficient fixed assets to use as security for lending. For these firms, 
entertainment expenses may actually become counter-productive. 
As for the other regressors in Table 3, it is interesting to note that once again, the 
lagged dependent variable has a positive coefficient. Moreover, both the return on assets 
and asset growth exhibit negative coefficients, suggesting that it is not necessarily the 
best performing firms that obtain long-term debt in China. This is in line with the 
hypothesized predictions of the pecking-order theory that more profitable firms will tend 
to reinvest their profits first, before resorting to external financing. Furthermore, we can 
see that it is the oldest firms that make use of more long-term debt. This is probably due 
to the fact that these firms suffer less from asymmetric information problems. Finally, 
contrary to the predictions of both the trade-off and pecking-order theories, both size and 
depreciation generally exhibit a poorly determined coefficient.  
In summary, social capital, asset structure, asset growth, and the return on assets 
are the main determinants of total, short, and long-term debt in China. It is also important 
to consider leverage within a dynamic framework, as the lagged dependent variable is 
significant in all our specifications. Size and age often play an important role, although 
the exact way in which they determine leverage depends on the type of leverage 
considered and the method of estimation used. Finally, depreciation is never an important 
determinant of leverage. These findings suggest that the trade-off and pecking-order 
theories do not fully explain the capital structure decisions of Chinese SMEs.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper represents a first attempt to understand the determinants of the capital 
structure decisions of Chinese SMEs. To this end, we have used a panel of 65,551 18 
 
privately owned Chinese SMEs over the period 2000-2006, emphasizing the role of 
investment in social capital, which we define as expenditure on entertainment undertaken 
by the firm’s management. Expenditure on building and maintaining social capital 
represents on average 6.7% of the total assets of the firms in our sample, a significant 
amount by conventional standards.  
Our findings demonstrate that in line with work done on larger Chinese firms 
(Chen, 2004), neither the static trade-off nor the pecking-order theory provide a complete 
explanation for the capital structure that Chinese SMEs adopt, largely because these 
theories ignore the role played by social capital.  We find that social capital is an 
important determinant of Chinese SMEs’ leverage. Specifically, it is positively associated 
with firms’ short-term leverage, but negatively associated with its long-term leverage, 
indicating that entertainment expenditure is important for firms who seek short-term 
financing from financial institutions, while it may become counter-productive for firms 
seeking longer-term financing. This may result from the fact that, typically, private firms 
were, and continue to be, discriminated against by the banking sector. The problem is 
likely to be particularly severe for SMEs, who may choose to entertain bank directors, 
making their goals and investment projects known to them, hence reducing the degree of 
asymmetric information that they face. As Chinese banks are typically reluctant to lend in 
the long-term, other factors become more important than social capital in determining the 
amount of long-term liabilities that SMEs obtain. Among these, asset structure plays a 
crucial role.  
Our study has significant managerial and policy implications. Senior managers 
need to recognize the importance of building strong relationships with other economic 
actors to enhance firm performance in China. Without adequate social capital, SMEs may 
face huge difficulties in obtaining adequate short-term financing which is so important 
for them to survive the early years of business growth. However, managers should also be 
aware of the negative consequences of becoming over-reliant on interpersonal 
relationships, and of the obligations that entails. As well as investing money on 
entertaining political and bank officials, and executives from other firms, managers 
should also seek to invest in fixed assets which may be used as security for formal 
lending, enabling them to achieve sustainable growth into the future. 19 
 
Policy makers need to recognize the importance of improving the ability of 
privately owned SMEs to access bank financing, especially in the long-term. This might 
be done through the development of effective credit-rating and guarantee schemes. 
Informal financing mechanisms based on social capital might have supported the growth 
of Chinese SMEs until the present day, but are arguably not appropriate if China is to 
develop world-class private enterprises able to compete globally. The development of 
effective formal financing mechanisms is especially important in times of economic crisis 
as we are experiencing today, when informal credit on offer to SMEs has dried up. 
 






Frequency  Percentage  Cumulative 
Percentage 
1  35,075  31.66  31.66 
2  21,733  19.62  51.28 
3  18,022  16.27  67.55 
4  17,426  15.73  83.29 
5  7,759  7  90.29 
6  4,521  4.08  94.37 
7  6,234  5.63  100 
Total  110,770  100   
 
 
Year  Frequency  Percentage  Cumulative 
Percentage 
2000  4,380  3.95  3.95 
2001  4,910  4.43  8.39 
2002  7,336  6.62  15.01 
2003  14,790  13.35  28.36 
2004  15,671  14.15  42.51 
2005  20,545  18.55  61.06 
2006  43,138  38.94  100 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Variables  Description  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
lev  total liabilities divided by total assets  0.587  0.256  0.002  1.517 
stlev  short-term liabilities divided by total assets  0.534  0.268  0.000  1.368 
ltlia_d 
 
dummy =0 if the firm has long- term liabilities, 
and 0 otherwise  0.244  0.430  0.000  1.000 
ltlev  long-term liabilities divided by total assets  0.038  0.099  0.000  0.677 
size  log (sales +1)   9.364  0.665  0.000  10.309 
age  age  8.211  6.030  1.000  60.000 
ass  net fixed assets divided by total assets  0.322  0.196  0.002  0.901 
asgr  fixed asset growth (proxy for growth potential)  0.076  0.499  -2.260  2.486 
roa  operating profit  divided by total assets   0.074  0.113  -0.186  0.744 
dept  depreciation divided by total assets  0.0003  0.0003  0.0000  0.0025 
social  social capital: entertainment fee divided by total assets  0.067  0.064  0.000  0.487 
 







Table 2: Dynamic models for total and short-term leverage 
 






















lev (t-1) /stlev (t-1)  0.714***  0.762***  0.673***  0.728*** 
  (0.00268)  (0.0257)  (0.00281)  (0.0270) 
size (t-1)  0.00249***  -8.65e-05  0.00361***  0.000442 
  (0.000876)  (0.00218)  (0.000985)  (0.00248) 
aget  5.29e-05  1.58e-05  -4.33e-06  0.000192 
  (8.19e-05)  (0.000266)  (8.85e-05)  (0.000317) 
ass (t-1)  -0.0518***  -0.0225  -0.0718***  -0.0394** 
  (0.00328)  (0.0148)  (0.00353)  (0.0159) 
asgr (t-1)  0.00657***  0.00246  0.00846***  0.00564** 
  (0.00107)  (0.00217)  (0.00115)  (0.00237) 
roa (t-1)  -0.157***  -0.00347  -0.186***  -0.0207 
  (0.00579)  (0.0168)  (0.00596)  (0.0185) 
dept (t-1)  2.889  2.071  2.163  0.782 
  (2.240)  (5.046)  (2.342)  (5.175) 
social (t-1)  0.0457***  0.0559**  0.0679***  0.0677** 
  (0.00837)  (0.0274)  (0.00888)  (0.0288) 
Constant  0.163***  0.143*  0.171***  0.259*** 
  (0.00976)  (0.0775) 
 
(0.0107)  (0.0973) 
Observations  109,686  94,100  110,633  94,922 
R-squared  0.582    0.554   
Specification 
tests (p-values) 
  AR(1) =  0.000  
AR(2) =  0.000  
AR(3) =  0.251 
Hansen/Sargan =0.088 
  AR(1) =  0.000  
AR(2) =  0.000  
AR(3) =  0.080 
Hansen/Sargan =0.012 
 
Notes: The specifications in columns 2 and 4 were estimated using a GMM system estimator. The figures 
reported in parentheses are asymptotic robust standard errors. Time dummies, province dummies, and 
industry dummies were included in all specifications. Instruments in columns 2 and 4 are two and/or three 
lags of all regressors except age in the differenced equation, and one lag of the difference of all regressors 
except age in the levels equation. A regional financial development indicator defined as the ratio of private 
lending to GDP, and dummies indicating whether the firm is affiliated to central, provincial, or other 
governments were also included in the instrument set as external  instruments.Time dummies, province 
dummies, and industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. AR(x) is a test for x
th-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. See Table 1 for definitions of all variables. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Dynamic models for long-term leverage 
 













ltlev (t-1)  0.573***  0.646***  1.094***  1.101*** 
  (0.00549)  (0.0363)  (0.00373)  (0.00702) 
size (t-1)  0.000462  0.000284  -0.00306  0.00770*** 
  (0.000412)  (0.000977)  (0.00303)  (0.00124) 
aget  0.000217***  0.000198  0.00214***  0.00182*** 
  (4.11e-05)  (0.000143)  (0.000133)  (0.000121) 
ass (t-1)  0.0120***  0.0175**  0.0478***  0.0462*** 
  (0.00151)  (0.00701)  (0.00246)  (0.00459) 
asgr (t-1)  -0.000998**  -0.00253**  -0.00238**  -0.00394*** 
  (0.000460)  (0.000994)  (0.000954)  (0.00152) 
roa (t-1)  -0.00720***  0.00553  -0.0515***  -0.0309*** 
  (0.00230)  (0.00840)  (0.00465)  (0.00790) 
dept (t-1)  -0.427  -2.603  -8.347***  0.987 
  (1.042)  (2.362)  (1.749)  (3.034) 
social (t-1)  -0.0188***  -0.0230*  -0.111***  -0.112*** 
  (0.00342)  (0.0120)  (0.00709)  (0.0134) 
Constant  0.0153***  -0.0704  -0.214***  -0.307*** 
  (0.00452)  (0.0435)  (0.0127)  (0.0147) 




  AR(1)  =  0.000 
AR(2)  =  0.000 
AR(3)  =  0.762 
Hansen 
/Sargan=0.412
   
 
Notes: Time dummies, province dummies, and industry dummies were included in all specifications. The 
figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic robust standard errors. The specification in column 2 was 
estimated using a GMM system estimator. Instruments in column 2 are two and/or three lags of all 
regressors except age, in the differenced equation, and one lag of the difference of those same instruments 
in the levels equation. Instruments in column 4 are the second lags of all explanatory variables except age. 
In both columns 2 and 4, a regional financial development indicator defined as the ratio of private lending 
to GDP, and dummies indicating whether the firm is affiliated to central, provincial, or other governments 
were also included in the instrument set as external instruments. Time dummies, province dummies, and 
industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. AR(x) is a test for x
th-order serial correlation 
in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
See Table 1 for definitions of all variables. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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